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Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT initiative, introduced by President Rafael Correa in 2007, aims to leave 846 
million barrels of oil located in one of the world’s most biodiverse spots, Yasuní National Park, 
underground in exchange for international financial contributions. Goals of the initiative are the 
preservation of pristine rainforest, the protection of indigenous tribes living in the area in voluntary 
isolation, and a contribution to climate change mitigation efforts by the avoidance of extraction-
related carbon emissions. This paper analyses the initiative in the context of environmental justice 
and raises the question whether it contributes to the self-determination of indigenous groups 
inhabiting the area with respect to their environment and to a distribution of environmental goods 
and bads that is more favourable to indígenas than the present situation. Assessing the initiative 
according to different parameters, the papers concludes that while ITT contributes to distributive 
justice through the avoidance of emissions, participatory justice for indigenous groups is lagging 
behind due to the central question of the initiative’s financial viability.  
 
Annotation 
At the time of writing, the collection of financial contributions was in full swing. However, on 
August 15, 2013, Correa declared the failure and abandonment of the initiative: “The world has 
failed us,” (Watts, 2013) announced the President, referring to the insufficient amount of 
international funding and the lack of understanding for the initiative’s vision of globally shared 
responsibility for climate and biodiversity protection. The extraction of oil will be carried out by the 
state-owned company Petroamazonas – preempting the sale of drilling licenses to foreign 
companies, whose offers Ecuador might not have been able to infinitely reject due to the country’s 
need for revenue – and the fields are expected to yield the first barrel of oil within two years 
(Meléndez, 2013). Correa’s announcement was followed by an outcry of civil society and Ecuador’s 
population, rekindling the debate about the origins and goals of the initiative. Civil society leaders 
are now pushing for a referendum to overturn the executive abandonment of the initiative – as of 
August 26, the outcome is unclear (Vidal, 2013). This turn of events is symptomatic of the ongoing 
conflicts surrounding the initiative, particularly between the Ecuadorian executive and civil society, 
and impressively illustrates the paradox of post-neoliberal resource politics and the crucial aspect of 
the initiative’s financial viability, treated at length in this paper.  
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Introduction – The Yasuní-ITT Initiative and Environmental Justice 
In 2007, Ecuador’s president Rafael Correa advanced an innovative proposal in front of the UN 
General Assembly: Ecuador, although a developing country dependent on the export of oil, would 
forgo the extraction of 846 million barrels in one of the most biodiverse spots on earth, Yasuní 
National Park, if the international community compensated the country for approximately half of 
the expected oil revenue, USD 3.6 billion. The proposal would simultaneously protect the park’s 
biodiversity, (uncontacted) indigenous groups inhabiting the area, and support climate change 
mitigation efforts by avoiding extraction-related CO2. The initiative, named ITT for the oil fields in 
question – Ishpingo, Tambococha, Tiputini – quickly garnered popular support and in 2010, a trust 
fund, administered by the UNDP, was established to which governments, private, and public actors 
can contribute. The revenue will be invested in conservation, renewable energy projects, and social 
development for indigenous peoples. So far, the initiative has been financially successful: In 2011, 
it surpassed its contribution goals and in 2012, the sum of pledges reached $300m (“The Yasuní-
ITT initiative: shifting paradigms,” 2012; “The Yasuní Initiative,” 2012; Vidal, 2012). 
This paper will focus on the contributions of the initiative to the field of environmental 
justice (EJ). Martinez-Alier (2002) identifies three strains of environmentalism: the “cult of the 
wilderness,” which focuses on the preservation of pristine nature, the “gospel of eco-efficiency,” 
emphasizing the sustainable use of resources, and the “environmentalism of the poor” (p.1), whose 
main interest is “not so much a concern with the rights of other species and of future generations of 
humans as a concern for today's poor humans” (p.11); it demands “contemporary social justice 
among humans” (p.11). An outgrowth of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, this last strain developed 
in response to “ecological distribution conflicts caused by economic growth” (p.14). Most visibly, it 
manifests itself as the EJ movement in the U.S., but exists in other parts of the world as well. In 
South America, it often consists of indigenous struggles for the recognition of their territorial rights 
(p.176) that, though formally granted, are being violated to extract oil that brings progress to urban 
elites, but has devastating consequences for native peoples and their lands (Kimerling, 2012). 
While the Yasuní-ITT initiative contributes to the first two strains of environmentalism – 
nature would be protected and trust fund money used for sustainability projects – this paper is going 
to pursue the following question: In how far is the initiative also a mechanism of environmental 
justice; that is, in how far does it contribute to indigenous self-determination with respect to their 
environment and to a distribution of environmental goods and bads that is more favorable to 
indigenous groups who are at present disproportionately bearing the cost of oil extraction?  
 To attempt an answer to this question, several parameters need to be defined. In accordance 
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with John Rawls’ theory of justice, justice is understood as both distributive justice, concerning the 
outcome, and procedural justice, concerning the process through which an outcome is reached. 
Environment is understood as exceeding ecological factors and encompassing the social realm in 
which we “live, work, [and] play” (Bullard, qtd. in Schweizer, 1999). Environmental justice, then, 
is concerned with “the right to the environment”: the right to determine in which environment one 
wants to “live, work, [and] play” (ibid.). 
An analysis of the academic and media discussion of the ITT initiative suggests that its 
contribution to environmental justice needs to be assessed on several levels. At the heart of the 
initiative lies an ongoing struggle between global and local success: while the initiative is a very 
progressive and emancipatory approach for the Ecuadorian state on the international scene and 
provides a vision of internationally shared responsibility for climate change, the protection of 
biodiversity, and discrepancies in development, those who had initiated the project even before 
Correa presented it in 2007, indigenous and environmentalist groups demanding respect for native 
land titles, are being marginalized in the process (Arsel, 2012, p.203) – the initiative has become 
about climate change mitigation rather than indigenous rights. 
Thus, ITT contributes to EJ on a distributive level: the negative effects of oil drilling and 
carbon emissions will be averted on both the local and the global level. On the other hand, while 
non-extraction is ultimately beneficial for indigenous groups, little room is left for participation 
from outside Ecuador’s national government in furthering the initiative, which undermines the right 
of civil society groups to procedural justice. However, the initiative still makes an important 
contribution: it attempts to shift the discourse on climate change mitigation to the avoidance of 
emission rather than emission trading, and thus attempts to alter established power relations: a 
developing country is calling upon industrial nations to assume responsibility. Therefore, if 
successful, the initiative could contribute to a new value framework on the international level that, 
through its new vision of development and respect for the natural world, is more conducive to the 
enforcement of indigenous rights and further bottom-up moves towards EJ in Ecuador and beyond. 
In order to be able to evaluate the contribution of the ITT initiative to environmental justice 
more thoroughly, I will begin my paper with a more detailed definition of the above-mentioned 
parameters: justice, environment, and environmental justice. Following those theoretical 
considerations, I am going to apply the defined parameters to the situation in the Ecuadorian 
Amazon: First, the historical and current situation of environmental injustice that indigenous groups 
experience will be outlined, followed by a chapter concerned with the effects that a mechanism like 
Yasuní-ITT might have on this situation.  
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Theories and Concepts 
In order to analyze the environmental injustice that indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon 
are experiencing and the potential contributions of Yasuní-ITT to environmental justice, several 
terms need to be defined for the context of this paper: What is environment, what is justice, and 
what is the combination of the two, environmental justice? For this purpose, I am first going to 
introduce two aspects of John Rawls’ theory of justice that are central to the EJ movement and the 
assessment of environmental justice in this paper: distributive and procedural justice. Subsequently, 
I will look into different understandings of environment – environment as an ecological sphere and 
environment as a social sphere – and finally put the terms justice and environment together by 
looking at the environmental justice movement that emerged in the United States of the 1980s. 
 
Conceptual Considerations I: John Rawls’ Theory of Justice 
In “A Theory of Justice,” Rawls examines principles of justice and the development of this 
fundamental virtue. Corresponding to the concept of a state of nature in the tradition of social 
contract thinking, he begins to develop his theory by describing a hypothetical situation from which 
principles of justice can emerge; an original state in which “no one knows his [sic] place in society, 
his class position or social status, [nor] his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, 
his intelligence, strength, and the like” (1972, p.12). Given this hypothetical situation, principles of 
justice are chosen behind a “veil of ignorance” (ibid.): Nobody is able to manipulate principles of 
justice in their favor; there are no power discrepancies and in this context Rawls conceives of 
“justice as fairness” (ibid.), as principles of justice are reached through agreements and bargaining 
in an initially fair situation.  
 Given the ignorance about one’s social position, Rawls assumes that two main principles 
would be chosen in order for everyone to be in a favorable situation:  
 
“First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached 
to positions and offices open to all.” (1972, p.60) 
 
While the first principle is a precondition to the second and refers to basic political and civil rights 
like freedom of speech and universal suffrage (ibid., p.61), the second principle contains two 
expressions that point to the different dimensions of justice Rawls’ theory entails: “to everyone’s 
advantage” (ibid., p.60) and “positions and offices open to all” (ibid.). 
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 The former, “to everyone’s advantage” (ibid., p.60), refers to the idea of distributive justice, 
or justice of outcome: how are “benefits and burdens of social cooperation” (ibid., p.7) adequately 
distributed? Following Pareto’s concept of optimality, Rawls argues that benefits do not necessarily 
have to be distributed in a way that provides everybody with the same share, but rather in a way that 
means “doing […] better for some individuals without doing any worse for others” (ibid., p.67). For 
example, the distribution of wealth and income does not have to be exactly equal, but to everyone’s 
advantage. Some people having and generating more wealth than others is not unjust per se, 
especially if the poor also profit from the increased overall amount of wealth – it is about improving 
the position of the poor without compromising the standing of the rich. It would be unjust, however, 
to enrich oneself at the cost of others.  
 Equally important is the latter: “positions and offices open to all” (ibid., p.60), procedural 
justice, the opportunity to participate in processes that create distributive outcomes. For Rawls, 
participation is almost more important than the actual outcome. If positions and offices weren’t 
accessible to all, but occupied by people whose work was beneficial to those not in decisive 
positions, those left out of the decision making process would still feel treated unjustly, and, in 
Rawls’ opinion, rightly so, as they are “debarred from experiencing the realization of self which 
comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of social duties” (ibid., p.84). In a certain view of 
procedural justice, an outcome is just as long as it has been developed in a just process
1
 – this, of 
course, requires a just system of institutions such as “a just political constitution and a just 
arrangement of economic and social institutions” (ibid., p.87); not every outcome that has 
undergone any established process is automatically just. 
 Concerning the first aspect, distributive justice, there is an important critique advanced by 
Wolfgang Sachs (2009) that is relevant to considerations about distributive environmental justice in 
this paper: In Rawls’ model, distributive justice is achieved without redistribution – as long as the 
rich do not enrich themselves at the cost of the poor, Rawls does not object to the concentration of 
wealth in the hands of the rich. His idea is closely related to a recurrent metaphor of economic 
development: if the cake of wealth is constantly growing, there will be more for everyone (or, 
internationally speaking, every nation) – every actor’s situation will improve in absolute terms 
without adjusting the relative portions actors receive. Sachs perceives this focus on growth as a 
                                                 
1
  Rawls distinguishes three types of procedural justice: perfect procedural justice, where objective criteria for a just  
outcome exist and a procedure can be devised that guarantees this outcome (a person cutting a cake into equally 
sized pieces), imperfect procedural justice, where criteria exist but the procedure does not guarantee a just outcome 
(criminal trials), and pure procedural justice, which considers the outcome as just as long as it is the result of a just 
and accessible process (1972, p.85 ff.).  
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mechanism of sidestepping the “hard question of justice” (Sachs, 2009, p.24f.): instead of finding 
ways of redistributing benefits and burdens, the overall amount of benefits is increased and 
distributed according to an unequal ratio.  
This approach, however, ignores the negative side effects of growth: the increasing scarcity 
of resources and ecological crises in the form of environmental destruction and climate change. 
Therefore, “greater equity cannot lie any longer in the perspective of ongoing growth” (ibid.) – but 
the hard question of how many resources can be consumed by any given actor, also with regard to 
the needs of future generations, needs to be addressed, which entails questions the national and 
international political economy. Going beyond Rawls, then, justice is about capping the excessive 
consumption of the rich rather than elevating the consumption of the poor to an equally destructive 
level. Against the background of this critique, distributive justice in this paper will also be analyzed 
with respect to its contribution to an alternative to growth – or, put differently, against the 
background of the following question: how can distributive justice be improved without retreating 
to destructive growth?  
 
Conceptual Considerations II: The Ecological and the Social Environment 
Following the definition of justice, the second crucial term needs to be operationalized: the 
environment. Particularly relevant for this paper is the relation between the natural environment and 
society. In the early phase of academic sociology, natural concerns were deliberately excluded from 
sociological considerations. While this happened to establish Sociology as a discipline free from 
natural determinisms
2
, it prevented a more productive dialectic consideration of the relation 
between nature and society (Grundmann, 1997, pp.533-535). Although theorists who came to be 
considered as constitutive of the sociological canon, like Weber and Marx
3
, perceived nature and 
society as inextricably intertwined, in what followed, sociology came to be constructed “as if nature 
did not matter” (Murphy, 1995, p.688). Nature was perceived as the ecological factors surrounding 
society and not as a realm in close interaction with the social. This exclusion caused sociology – 
and society – to be ill-prepared for environmental problems: the reciprocal effects that nature and 
society have on each other were not a topic of sociological investigation (Grundmann, 1997, p.533).
                                                 
2
  In the 16th century, climatic and racial factors were often considered explanations for social phenomena; in the early 
20th century, social Darwinism continued this tradition, causing the emergent discipline of Sociology to reject those 
alleged explanations in order to develop its own identity. (Grundmann, 1997, p.533) 
3
  Karl Marx perceives precisely the dialectic relation between society and nature that Grundmann (1997, p.543) 
would find conducive: He sees a “social-ecological metabolism” (Bellamy Foster, 1999, p.378) – a close 
interdependence between humans and nature in the process of production. Similarly, Max Weber was aware of the 
relation between ongoing processes of rationalization and resource use; a combination steering society into 
“’mechanized petrification’” until “’the last ton of fossilized coal’” has been burnt (ibid., p.399). 
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 It is little surprising, then, that once ecological concerns did arise in response to an ongoing 
industrialization with destructive effects for humans and nature, they were characterized by the very 
same understanding of the separation of humans from their environment. Afore-mentioned 
Martinez-Alier (2002) analyzes two such strands: the “cult of the wilderness” (p.1) and the “gospel 
of eco-efficiency” (ibid.). In both cases, nature and society are perceived as separate realms: the 
former wants to protect landscapes and wildlife for their own sake and certainly also for human 
enjoyment, the latter focuses on the resources one realm, nature, provides for the other, society.  
In contrast to this separate perception there are other views of what the environment is that 
are more conducive for the field of environmental justice and this paper. The environment can also 
be understood in ways that exceed ecological perceptions. A central figure of the early EJ 
movement, Robert Bullard, argued: “the environment is everything: where we live, work, play, go 
to school, as well as the physical and natural world” (qtd. in Schweizer, 1999). Here, the 
environment is more than a variety of ecological factors; in fact, it is everything that is not the unit 
in question itself, and the physical and the social environment are inextricably intertwined. This 
view allows for a much richer understanding of the environment that includes non-ecological 
factors that might have effects on the unit in question. The field of environmental research is thus 
opened up to questions of social relations – how is the environment of a given unit in question 
structured, what does it consist of, and what are the power relations in this environment?  
 
Putting it Together – The Environmental Justice Movement (EJM) 
It is precisely those questions related to the social environment that the Environmental Justice 
Movement
4
, which emerged in the 1980s in the U.S., is concerned with.“Communities are not all 
created equal,” (Bullard, 1993, p.15) stated afore-mentioned Robert Bullard in reference to a 
problem for which awareness began to gain momentum on the level of grassroots activism in the 
U.S. shortly after the Civil Rights Movement: the “disproportionate allocation of toxic waste to 
Latino or African-American communities in urban-industrial situations and in the USA” (Martinez-
Alier, 2002, p.168), or, generally speaking, the disproportionate burdening of minority groups with 
pollution and hazardous waste.  
According to Low and Gleeson (1998), the environment comprises both “’good’ and ‘bad’ 
elements” (p.102) which need to be distributed across communities, nations and the globe – goods 
                                                 
4
  It is important to emphasize the distinction between the Environmental Justice Movement and Environmental Justice 
academic research. Awareness for the problem of environmental injustice emerged on the level of grassroots 
activism, followed by the establishment of an analytical frame in EJ research. Today, the movement is an expression 
of the analytical frame that has been formed by grassroots struggles. 
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being, for example, clean air and fresh water; bads being the opposite, such as polluted air, 
hazardous waste – in short, land uses with harmful consequences for humans. Often, the land uses 
per se are socially accepted; their physical proximity, however, causes concerns about human health 
and environmental destruction, turning siting decisions into highly political affairs. A prime 
example of this is the desire for low energy prices and protest against siting decisions of nuclear 
reactors or waste disposals. While most people favor the former, nobody wants the consequences of 
the latter in their environment – not in my backyard (NIMBY) is the formula that summarizes this 
antipathy to the direct confrontation with environmental hazards (Low & Gleeson, 1998, p.114). 
 In the political and economic climate of the U.S. in the 1980s, geared towards economic 
growth,
5
 the question of where to locate industrial residues became ever more pressing and in the 
same decade, activist groups in the spirit of the Civil Rights Movement began to show the nation 
what they had perceived for a long time: hazardous waste sites, landfills, incinerators, smelters, and 
polluting industries (summarized as locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) by Low and Gleeson 
(1998, p.112)), were increasingly and intentionally located in those areas whose inhabitant had the 
weakest political clout to protest against siting decisions: communities inhabited mainly by “Blacks, 
Latinos, Indigenous peoples, Asians, migrant farm workers and low-income people” (Gosine & 
Teelucksingh, 2008, p.4). In the absence of comprehensive regulation, environmental bads were 
distributed according to racist criteria, causing ethnic minorities to disproportionately bear the 
consequences of pollution without being able to participate in the design and implementation of 
environmental policies (Low & Gleeson, 1998, Bullard, 1993, Gosine & Teelucksingh, 2008). 
 African-American civil rights leader Ben Chavis coined the term “environmental racism” 
(Hasler, 1994, p.417) to describe this phenomenon, an extension of institutional racism that 
structurally disadvantages non-white citizens. A crucial incident of protest against environmental 
racism took place in Warren County, North Carolina, in 1982: A hazardous waste facility was to be 
placed in Afton, the poorest community in the state with an overwhelmingly African-American 
population (84%), far away from the white middle class. The residents organized to avert this case 
of PIBBY, place in blacks’ backyards (Gosine & Teelucksingh, 2008, p.2),  and although they were 
not able to overturn the siting decision, this instance of grassroots protest is considered the 
beginning of a social movement: the Environmental Justice Movement, which, in its early phase, 
                                                 
5
  Following the Fordist compromise of the post-WWII decades, U.S. society experienced a set of political and 
economic changes in the 1980s sometimes subsumed as “Reagonomics.” Market liberalism and processes of 
neoliberalization began to proliferate, leading to decentralization, deregulation of financial markets, privatization, 
flexible labor relations and social austerity in the name of economic growth and the strengthening of the U.S. 
position in the global economy. The environment was not conducive for concerns about negative impacts of 
economic growth or even skepticism towards growth as such (see, for example, Harvey, 2005). 
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constituted an “organized movement against ‘environmental racism’” (Martinez-Alier, 2002, 
p.168); it made claims for the equal treatment of all ethnicities with respect to the distribution of 
environmental bads.  
 Following the Warren County incident, the notions of environmental racism and 
environmental justice gained momentum in the national debate. Studies conducted by Reverend 
Ben Chavis and the United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice (see Chavis & Lee, 
1987) elaborated race as the strongest predictor for the deliberate siting of locally unwanted land 
uses. This observation reveals the power discrepancies underlying environmental injustices: for 
minorities, factors like a non-white ethnicity, lower levels of education and a lower income are 
often inextricably intertwined, making it harder for minorities to either avoid the injustice by 
moving away (Bullard, 1993, p.21) or to influence policies in a favorable way. Minorities often do 
not have the political clout the white middle-class has; therefore, increased middle class resistance 
against LULUs and resulting environmental regulations favored the middle class and contributed to 
aggravating the situation of the poor, both nationally through siting decisions and internationally 
through the export of waste into developing countries (Bullard, 1993, Low & Gleeson, 1998).  
 As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, Martinez-Alier (2002) identifies two strains of 
environmentalism that have preceded environmental justice: the “cult of the wilderness”, following 
the tradition of John Muir, and the gospel of eco-efficiency: calls for the “efficient and sustainable 
use of natural resources” (p.169). Unlike those two strains, environmental justice does not stem 
from a desire to protect or sustainably use the natural world, but it focuses on humans living within 
the environment and the environment as a “requirement for livelihood” (ibid., p.11). It is concerned 
not so much “with the rights of other species and of future generations of humans [than with] 
today’s poor humans” (ibid.) and their right to their environment. If the cult of the wilderness and 
sustainable resource use are the domain of the white middle class (Chavis & Lee, 1987, p.6), 
environmental justice is “the environmentalism of the poor” (Martinez-Alier, 2002), which connects 
environmental concerns, in the sense of ecological, to conflicts created by economic growth (p.14), 
broader struggles against racial and gender inequality and for social justice. The movement is aware 
of the close relation between racism and environmental destruction, which Jeffrey Myers (2005) 
neatly summarizes: “[R]acial oppression and environmental destruction [are] inherently and 
historically related [since] the ethnocentric outlook that constructed 'whiteness' over and against the 
alterity of other racial categories is the same perspective that constructed the anthropocentric 
paradigm at the root of environmental destruction” (p. 5). 
 In order to do justice to this recognition, the EJM wants to go beyond not-in-my-backyard 
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approaches. Unlike the mainstream environmental movement of the white middle class, the EJ 
movement “refused to say ‘not in my backyard’ without questioning or caring about whose 
backyard the problem ended up in” (Taylor, 1993, p.54). Consequently, the movement demanded 
that environmental injustices like hazardous sites should not be located in anyone’s backyard 
(NIABY) or not even on planet earth at all (NOPE) (Taylor, 1993; Low & Gleeson, 1998), implying 
a severe reconsideration of the national and international political economy and a critique of the 
“production of risk” rather than the “spatial allocation of risk” (Low & Gleeson, 1998, p.131).  
Following the initial exposure of environmental racism, and in line with Low and Gleeson’s 
call for an analytical move towards the root of the problem, the movement’s conception of the 
environment, justice, and consequently of its own goals, have become broader. In 1991, 17 
principles of environmental justice were developed at the First National People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit, principles that include the right of self-determination with 
regard to one’s environment as well as the equal participation in decision-making processes – John 
Rawls’ concept of procedural justice (Gosine & Teelucksingh, 2008, p.10-11). In fact, the concept 
of environmental justice has over time become institutionalized and is now defined by the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as follows:  
 
“Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people 
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, 
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. EPA has 
this goal for all communities and persons across this Nation. It will be achieved when 
everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and 
equal access to the decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, 
learn, and work.” (EPA, 2013) 
 
This definition shows that the focus of the early movement, the racialized distribution of 
environmental bads, has been extended and correlates with Rawls’ understanding of justice: both 
procedural and distributive justice are relevant. EJ is achieved when “everyone enjoys the same 
degree of protection from environmental and health hazards” (EPA, 2013), distributive justice, and 
everyone has “equal access to the decision-making process” (ibid.), participatory justice. Also, the 
definition of environment exceeds ecological approaches and is similar to Bullard’s approach: we 
“live, learn, and work” (ibid.) in the environment. The physical and the cultural environment are 
inextricably intertwined and EJ as defined by the EPA refers to both the quality of the ecological 
surroundings as well as the quality of human live that can develop within those surroundings. 
 “Is All Justice Environmental,” then (Hamlin, 2008, p.145)? And how is EJ different from 
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social justice (SJ) if the environment is a social environment? Against the historical and theoretical 
background presented, I argue that the difference between the two is of an analytical rather than a 
factual nature – the phenomena the two describe are very similar; what differs is the perspective. 
While I understand social justice as a macro approach that analyzes the distribution of justice within 
a society as a whole – which groups have access to which resources; does everyone have the same 
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes, and why are certain groups disadvantaged 
– EJ takes communities as starting points and asks whether members of that community have the 
right to determine and the capacity to enforce how they want to live, work, and play. Since EJ began 
as a movement against environmental racism, its emphasis on social issues functions as a corrective 
to traditional environmentalist concerns. It highlights the close relation between social exclusion 
and environmental destruction – ecological concerns are embedded in a social context. This can 
take place on a top-down level focused on frameworks like human rights, but also on a more 
critical, bottom-up level that asks for the discrepancy between the consensus within a community 
concerning their environment and the environmental reality.
6
  
 What EJ and SJ have in common is a concern with power relations between actors. Rawls’ 
“veil of ignorance” helps to illustrate this characteristic: Only in this hypothetical situation does 
Rawls see the beginning of justice – in a situation, in which power discrepancies are eliminated. 
Consequently, injustice is closely related to actors’ awareness of their social position and of power 
differences and it is precisely those power differences that both social and environmental justice 
highlight. Both concepts are means to point out similar patterns of power and domination and as 
both concepts often reveal that the same groups experience different injustices, they are potentially 
emancipatory tools that can provide alternative narratives to dominant understandings that lead to 
precisely those injustices.  
 
Environmental Injustice in the Ecuadorian Amazon 
Drawing on the conceptual considerations of the previous chapter, I am now going to analyze the 
situation of indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon against the background of oil extraction 
in the rainforest. The underlying question here is the following: In how far are indigenous peoples 
in the Amazon experiencing distributive and procedural injustices with regard to extractive 
industries? This is necessary in order to outline the situation that a mechanism like Yasuní-ITT 
                                                 
6
  For the latter approach, it is important to continuously question and, if necessary, revise the notion of community – 
we need to question whom we perceive as part of a community and if in fact everyone has the chance to contribute 





Oil Extraction and Indígenas – The Initial Situation  
Following the large-scale discovery of oil in Ecuador in the 1960s
7
, the country has turned into a 
nation that is heavily dependent on the export of oil (Pichón, 1992, p.664, Kimerling, 2012, p.236).
 
For its size, Ecuador has fairly large oil reserves, the third largest reserves on the South American 
continent: an estimated 7.2 billion barrels. Ecuador is the second largest provider of oil for the West 
Coast of the United States and half of the country’s export earnings as well as about one third of the 
federal budget stem from the extraction of oil (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012). The 
largest reserves are located in the country’s east, the Amazon basin, with the amount in Yasuní’s ITT 
fields, Ecuador’s second-largest reserve, constituting 20% of the country’s overall reserves (Larrea 
et al., 2009). 
As Ecuador’s Amazon region is inhabited by a large number of indigenous nations who 
subsist on rain forest land, the discovery of oil in this area is inextricably intertwined with the fate 
of those groups. While indígenas in the Amazon had mostly lived in isolation from the rest of the 
Ecuadorian nation until the 1960s, two mutually reinforcing developments turned contact with and 
appeasement of indigenous tribes into a “national imperative” (Kimerling, 2012, p.237): the 
agrarian reforms of 1964 and 1973, leading to the 1964 “Ley de Tierras Baldías”, Law of Public 
Lands, and Texaco’s 1967 discovery of oil in the province of Napo (Perreault, 2001, p.386, Sawyer, 
2004, p.11). In order to enable extractive activity and relieve densely populated urban regions, a 
government-promoted colonization of native lands in the Amazon began that portrayed those lands 
as “baldías”, empty.  
Due to the emerging network of petroleum infrastructure, the Amazon region was made 
more accessible and attractive to settlers (Perreault, 2001, p.386). It is here that the multilayered 
negative consequences for indigenous peoples become particularly visible: the search for oil led to 
violent entries into native territories, formerly isolated tribes like the Huaorani were forced to 
establish contact with the rest of the nation in order to guarantee access to oil, peoples were 
relocated, traditional subsistence processes interrupted, and indígenas pushed into a dependency on 
trade relations (Kimerling, 2012, p.239).  
 
                                                 
7
  The history of oil development in Ecuador dates back to 1878, when the National Assembly granted M.G. Mier the 
exclusive right to extract natural resources. In 1937, Shell received the first concession for exploration in the Oriente 
region, but the large-scale oil extraction did not gain momentum until the late 1960s (Texaco, n.d.).  
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Distributive Justice, Procedural Justice, and Indigenous Protest 
Put very simply, indigenous groups in the Amazon are experiencing a severe case of distributional 
injustice. While oil did bring progress to elites in urban settings, it brought destruction for natives in 
the form of environmental degradation and human health impacts (Kimerling, 2012, p.237, 
Perreault, 2001, p.386). This discrepancy is in accordance with a phenomenon known as the oil 
curse (“The paradox of plenty,” 2005, Vidal, 2011): developing countries dependent on one single 
resource and export good are usually not able to sufficiently diversify their economy and generate 
wealth for society as a whole, which leads to profit for a small elite at the cost of large shares of the 
population – a Rawlsian injustice. In Ecuador, indígenas who inhabit the region in which the oil is 
located “have borne the costs of oil development without sharing in its benefits” (Kimerling, 2012, 
p.237) a problem of distributive justice that negatively affects a non-white part of the population. 
How did indigenous peoples react to this situation? Like in the early phase of the EJ 
movement in the United States, indígenas began to organize and protest on a grassroots level 
(Sawyer, 2004, p.15). While the first indigenous federation was founded in the 1960s and the 
network of associations has grown and is now organized on the local, regional, and national level 
with CONAIE, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, constituting the umbrella 
organization, their most spectacular public protest didn’t take place until the 1990s: In 1992, more 
than 2000 indígenas marched from the Amazon to Quito to demand the legal recognition of land 
titles
8
 for large shares of traditionally used rain forest land that would prohibit extractive activity in 
indigenous territory (Sawyer, 2004, p.27).
9
  
The recognition of indigenous rights within but independent from traditional civil rights was 
a notion that began to gain momentum in the late 1970s (Araújo, 1991, p.23), and over time, 
Ecuadorian indígenas attained several successes: In 1990, the land of the Huaorani was legally 
enlarged, and following the protest march of 1992, indígenas received legal title to 55% of claimed 
land (Kimerling, 2012, p.239, Sawyer, 2004, p. 50). The same holds true for constitutional rights: In 
1983, the indigenous language Kichwa was mentioned in the constitution as being part of Ecuador’s 
national culture (Marés de Souza Filho, 1991, p.30), and the constitution of 1998 explicitly grants 
                                                 
8  Another central demand was the recognition of Ecuador’s plurinationality, as indígenas are not a coherent ethnic 
minority, but constitute around 40% of the country’s population and consist of diverse nations (Smith, 1992, p.102). 
In addition, legal action has been brought against oil companies, for example against Texaco in 1993 and in 2003 
against ChevronTexaco (Kimerling, 2012).  
9
  Interestingly, when fighting for what is an issue of environmental justice – the right to exercise self-determination 
with regard to the environment one lives in – native activists have repeatedly drawn on another strain of 
environmentalism, the cult of the wilderness. By depicting themselves as the “guardians of the Amazon” (Sawyer, 
2004, p.53), indígenas employed the rhetoric of (Western) conservationists in order to make their actual concern, 
indigenous rights and self-determination, more familiar to the white middle class, nationally and internationally. 
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collective rights to the country’s central non-white groups, indígenas and afroecuatorianos. In 2008, 
the constitution was expanded to strengthen indigenous rights and it also became the first 
constitution in the world to grant rights to nature. What is more, two indigenous concepts found 
entry into the constitution and reinforce the nation’s plurinational character: Ecuadorians have the 
right to “sumak kawsay”, buen vivir in Spanish, the good way of living in a healthy and 
ecologically balanced environment, and nature is referred to as “Pacha Mama”, and has the right to 
“integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, 
structure, functions and evolutionary processes.” (Political Database of the Americas, 2011). 
Although several of those developments have a progressive character, victories for 
indigenous people were never complete and it becomes clear that indigenous groups are 
experiencing procedural injustices. The 1992 land grant, for example, divided the land into different 
sections irrespective of the territorial boundaries indígenas themselves perceived, resulting in 
conflicts between clans that undermine coherence and solidarity. Moreover, in spite of the titling, 
the policies that had enabled colonization of the Amazon region remained in place until 1997 
(Kimerling, 2012, p.238) and a severe legal loophole that affects both land titles and constitutional 
rights remains to this day: the state is the owner of natural resources located underneath titled 
territories (Smith, 1992; p.104). As a consequence, land titles didn’t protect indígenas from further 
invasion and destruction of their territory by oil companies, to whom the state as the owner of 
resources had granted concessions, and even in the 2008 constitution, natural resources are listed as 
the “unalienable heritage of the state”; they are “strategic resources” (Political Database of the 
Americas, 2011) which the state, though required to minimize harmful ecological and social effects, 
can command.  
It becomes clear that the basic injustice that is happening to Ecuadorian indígenas is the lack 
of recognition of their land titles. While this is a strong case of social injustice – legal rights of a 
non-white segment of society are undermined in favor of economic growth – it is also a case of 
environmental injustice, as the environment in which indígenas want to “live, work, [and] play” 
(Schweizer, 1999) is negatively affected by the failed recognition of land ownership and, following 
this underlying injustice, by environmental degradation and health hazards related to oil extraction. 
While this is not a typical siting decision – the location of the oil cannot be changed – 
environmental racism is still visible. Harm to indigenous groups who have little political clout is 
accepted in order to provide a social good, wealth, for more affluent, usually non-indigenous, parts 
of the nation. In the following section, I am going to analyze whether, and if so, how, the Yasuní-
ITT initiative contributes to environmental justice on the distributive and procedural level. 
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Yasuní – A Mechanism of Environmental Justice? 
Concerning the ITT initiative, there is an ongoing tension between global and local politics that is 
central to the assessment of the initiative’s contribution to environmental justice. The tension 
concerns the main goal of the initiative: Is it mainly a means of mitigating climate change or is it an 
attempt to reach indigenous self-determination and environmental justice for the groups affected by 
oil extraction? In this chapter, I am first going to outline the content of the initiative and then 
analyze its contribution to distributive and procedural justice. Following the argument that 
procedural justice is lagging behind, I will present possible reasons for this problem, most 
importantly the initiative’s financial viability. Further, Enzensberger’s idea of global projection will 
be relevant to the analysis of tensions between the national and international spheres. 
 
Yasuní-ITT: An Overview 
On September 24, 2007, Ecuador’s newly-elect president Rafael Correa presented an “Initiative to 
Change History” (Larrea et al., 2009, p.1): Although the country depends on the export of oil, the 
administration proposed to indefinitely forgo the extraction of 846 million barrels of oil located 
underneath one of the world’s most biodiverse spots, Yasuní National Park. As the non-extraction is 
financially harmful in the short run, Correa challenged the international community to assume co-
responsibility for the global problems of climate change and biodiversity loss and to support the 
proposal by partially compensating Ecuador for the provision of this environmental good, an intact 
Amazonian ecosystem, with a sum of $4.6 billion (Correa, 2007, p.2).
10
 If the proposal succeeds, 
three goals will be met: First, the initiative is an innovative option for combating global warming by 
avoiding the emissions associated with the extraction of oil – 410 million tons of CO2; secondly, it 
contributes to the protection of biodiversity and supports the voluntary isolation of two indigenous 
tribes, the Tagaeri and Taromenane, and finally it forms part of a strategy directed towards post-
petroleum approaches of human development (Larrea et al., 2009, p.2, UNDP, 2012).  
The oil constitutes 20% of the country’s reserves and is located in three fields underneath 
Yasuní National Park. In 1979, the National Park was established to protect the area’s outstanding 
biodiversity – it has the greatest diversity of amphibians worldwide, the greatest concentration of 
tree and shrub species, and one single upland hectare contains more tree species than the continental 
U.S. and Canada combined (Martin & Finer, 2010, part 1). In 1989, the UNESCO made the park a 
                                                 
10  While Correa in his initial proposal asked for $4.6 billion, articles referring to his speech at the General Assembly 
usually talk about a demand of $3.5 billion over either ten or 13 years, or a contribution of $350 million for each of 
either 10 or 13 years. 
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World Biosphere Reserve, limiting the activities allowed within the reserve to “cooperative 
activities compatible with sound ecological practices, including environmental education, 
recreation, ecotourism, and applied and basic research.”11 
Yasuní is also the ancestral and current home of the Huaorani, an indigenous population, and 
their distant relatives Tagaeri and Taromenane, who live in voluntary isolation and have no peaceful 
contact with outsiders. In order to protect the traditions of the isolated tribes, a part of Yasuní was 
declared “Zona Intangible”, untouchable zone, in 1999 and officially put off-limits to the oil 
industry (Finer, Moncel & Jenkins, 2010, p.64). However, due to the mentioned loophole in 
Ecuador’s Constitution, the state remained the owner of natural resources and can proceed with 
extractive activity even in protected areas if deemed in the national interest. Consequently, oil 
extraction has taken place within the National Park and the Intangible Zone, accompanied by 
protest of indigenous peoples, and previous administrations had already developed plans to exploit 
the ITT fields, a part of which overlaps with the intangible zone (cf. Finer & Martin, 2010). 
The collection of funds for the initiative is organized by the United Nations Development 
Program: In 2010, a trust fund was established to which other nations, organizations, and individual 
actors can contribute. The trust fund consists of two windows: the Capital Fund Window, which 
attempts to collect $3.6 billion
12
, half the expected foregone revenue, and the Revenue Fund 
Window, to which contributions that support the larger goals of the initiative, social and sustainable 
development, can be made. Pledges and contributions can take the form of direct cash 
commitments, but also, for example, debt swaps. In exchange for a contribution, the donor receives 
a Yasuní Guarantee Certificate over the contributed sum that guarantees the perpetual oil 
moratorium and becomes redeemable in case of extraction by a subsequent government (UNDP, 
2012).
13
 In 2011, the initiative surpassed its contribution goals and in 2012, the sum of pledges and 
deposits reached $300m (“The Yasuní-ITT initiative: shifting paradigms,” 2012; “The Yasuní 
Initiative,” 2012; Vidal, 2012). 
 
Not in Anyone’s Backyard: ITT and Distributive Justice  
The contribution of Yasuní-ITT to distributive justice is particularly visible with regard to Sachs’ 
critique of justice without redistribution: in order to prevent further environmental degradation, 
                                                 
11
  See http://www.sosyasuni.org/en/; accessed 03/05/2013 
12
  While the initial proposal called for the collection of $3.6 billion over a period of 13 years, Correa indefinitely 
extended the deadline in 2009, giving more credibility to Ecuador’s goal of non-extraction (Martin, 2010, p.34). 
13
  At some point of the development of the initiative, the idea of including Yasuní Guarantee Certificates into Kyoto-
recognized emission trading schemes; this, however, has been abandoned again. 
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alternatives to development strategies based on economic growth need to be found. ITT goes into 
precisely this direction: As stated by the UNDP, the initiative is a move towards strategies of human 
development that are not based on non-renewable resources (UNDP, 2012). In accordance with 
Ecuador’s 2008 constitution, development is to be restructured along the lines of the indigenous 
concept sumak kawsay, buen vivir, harmonious co-existence with nature (Arsel & Angel, 2012); 
however, the implementation has been lagging behind as the country depends on revenue from oil 
extraction. ITT with its mechanism of compensation now provides Ecuador with a financially viable 
option of leaving the oil underground. While the initiative has been criticized for its focus on 
compensation instead of the application of already existing rights (Finer, Moncel & Jenkins, 2010, 
p.65), international contributions help the developing country to comply with its internal laws and 
regulations. At the same time, the initiative attempts to decommodify our understanding of nature
14
 
– it is not only relevant as a source for national resources, and other forms of value, such as an 
intact ecosystem, gain recognition. It becomes evident that the initiative is attempting to alter our 
understanding of value (creation) and development.  
 Therefore, the proposal goes into a NIABY rather than a NIMBY direction: If oil remains 
underground, indigenous groups on the local level will not be confronted with the immediate 
negative consequences of drilling in their backyard or environment. Deforestation, extensions in 
infrastructure, the risk of destructive oil spills, negative effects on human health, and the destruction 
of biodiversity are simply avoided; they no longer take place in anyone’s backyard. Simultaneously, 
an environmental good is made accessible: an intact and diverse ecosystem. On a global level, the 
NIABY effect is also visible. If extraction and infrastructural processes surrounding extraction do 
not take place, a large number of CO2 emissions is avoided altogether – like the ecologically 
destructive local effects, a certain amount of emissions is simply avoided; an important contribution 
to climate change mitigation efforts that was advanced at a time at which awareness for the 
destructive effects of global warming increased (see, for example, IPCC Report, 2007).  
 
ITT and Procedural Justice 
While ITT does contribute to distributive environmental justice on a local and global level, opinions 
diverge concerning the aspect of procedural justice and the ability for various groups of actors to 
                                                 
14
  While Yasuní might become decommodified with regard to oil, commodification is still visible: as will be discussed 
later, the value of the protected area is measured in relation to the market price of carbon. While Ecuador might 
want to transcend commodified versions of nature, this is financially harmful for a developing country dependent on 
resources. Consequently, relapses to established paradigms – development through resource extraction, the 
commodification of nature – recur throughout Correa’s time in office: his decidedly post-neoliberal approach 
frequently draws on neoliberal practices (Arsel, 2012, Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010).  
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participate in the proposal’s design and advancement – a topic that is closely related to the financial 
viability of the initiative. In order to understand the debates about procedural justice, the origins of 
the initiative need to be analyzed.  
 While Correa is often portrayed as the initiative’s ideological father, he is in fact indebted to 
ideas that have emerged within civil society a decade before the proposal was presented. When the 
organization Oilwatch was founded in 1996, protest against oil extraction grew and the created a 
more coherent network of opponents, which soon advanced the idea of an oil moratorium to stop 
extraction (Arsel & Angel, 2012, p.214). One of Ecuador’s most vocal organizations, Acción 
Ecológica, belongs to the opponents of oil extraction as well
15. Similarly, CONAIE, Ecuador’s 
federation of indigenous groups opposes the destructive neo-colonialism exercised by transnational 
corporations – such as Texaco – in indigenous villages.16 In 2005, this network presented a report 
named “An Eco-Logical call for conservation, climate and rights,” outlining the basic idea of 
compensation for non-extraction and starting the public debate (Arsel & Angel, 2012). What is 
more, in 2009 Alberto Acosta, future Minister of Energy and Mines, published “The Curse of 
Abundance”, in which he draws on the resource curse thesis and argues that Ecuador will not be 
able to overcome its social and environmental problems by further relying on the extractive industry 
(Arsel & Angel, 2012, p. 214).  
The basic idea to leave oil underground out of which the ITT initiative developed stems 
from a context that is traditionally concerned with environmental and indigenous rights. Its initial 
goals related to the protection of the environment and the right of indigenous groups to live in an 
intact environment and, in the case of the Tagaeri and Taromenane, to continue their voluntary 
isolation in the “Zona Intangible”, or, put differently, to be able to determine in which environment 
to live. It is a question of indigenous rights: While rights had been previously granted to indígenas, 
and even fortified and expanded to nature with the 2008 constitution, their application is lagging 
behind and the ITT initiative started as an attempt to enforce non-extraction in indigenous territory.  
 Although the idea of an oil moratorium emerged within civil society, the initiative is today 
portrayed as the centerpiece of Correa’s revolución ciudadana the citizen’s revolution and the 
country’s approach to go beyond resource-based development (Arsel, 2012). Moreover, as the 
administration needs financial contributions from the international community, negotiations are 
largely taking place on the international level. How does this affect the ability of civil society and 
indigenous communities to participate in the further development and implementation of the 
                                                 
15
 See http://www.accionecologica.org/; accessed 03/05/2013 
16
  See http://www.conaie.org/sobre-nosotros/que-es-la-conaie; accessed 03/05/2013 
 21 
 
initiative, that is, their right to procedural justice?  
 Pamela Martin (2010), a researcher involved with the initiative, sees the proposal as a 
challenge to existing institutional norms that, due to the global relevance of its demands, requires 
the coordination of and dynamic interaction between different levels of actors: civil society, national 
and international governments and NGOs. In a first step, interaction took place between the 
Ecuadorian civil society and the national government. Once the administration had adopted the 
proposal, it needed to be presented on the international level, as it implies new international 
institutional norms. In order to be internationally successful – and Ecuador depended on this 
success for the acceptance of (financial) co-responsibility by others – existing international norms 
need to be altered, and during this process, the national government represents the claim. While 
Martin concedes that participation for non-governmental initiators can be difficult at this stage 
(p.19, also see Warnars, 2009, p.61), she maintains an optimistic outlook and argues that “domestic 
supporters who were originally involved in the initiative […] re-engage and ultimately dialogue 
with the government and international supporters to re-fashion the initiative.” (2010, p.31). 
 Murat Arsel and Natalia Angel (2012) are more pessimistic. They argue that the proposal 
that emerged as the result of long-standing grassroots resistance from indigenous and 
environmentalist groups against oil extraction and advanced to an idea articulated by the country’s 
civil society “had effectively been appropriated by a state machinery whose actions and processes – 
regardless of their intent – had marginalized the very people that advocated the proposal in the first 
place” (p.218). Negotiations are largely taking place on the international level with little access for 
Ecuadorian non-governmental organizations; local movements are only mentioned in UNDP 
document as supportive of the proposal (ibid., p.217). In this view, procedural justice is not given 
for indigenous and environmental groups. As “their” initiative gained international momentum, it 
becomes increasingly hard for the original initiators to participate in the further process.  
 
Procedural Justice and Financial Viability 
In order to answer the question of why procedural justice is lagging behind, the political context 
from which the initiative emerged as well as several transformations it underwent have to be taken 
into account. First of all, the initiative needs to be understood against the backdrop of a changing 
political scene in several South American countries: the promise of a political left turn in response 
to neoliberal policies that had aggravated poverty and inequality, spearheaded by presidents of three 





 In order to develop a counter-narrative to neoliberalization, political 
leaders have begun to address precisely those issues that had been left to the market by previous 
regimes, such as economic redistribution and natural preservation (Arsel & Angel, 2012, p.216). 
At the heart of this left turn lies a crucial conflict: At the same time as concerns for nature 
and social equity become relevant, additional financial means are needed in order to fund an 
expanded social agenda, requiring the state to generate more revenue, which in the case of a 
petroleum-exporting developing country signifies a turn to increased activity in the extractive 
sector, the difference to neoliberal approaches consisting in the nationalization of resources. Thus, 
at the same time as Ecuador granted constitutional rights to nature, the extractive industry became 
increasingly important (Arsel & Angel, 2012, p.211). Kaup (forthcoming, qtd. in Bebbington & 
Bebbington, 2012, p.12) diagnoses a path dependency of the afore-mentioned resource curse – a 
country dependent on one stable export has not been able to sufficiently diversify its economy in 
order to generate revenue from other sources and resumes a practice harmful to their ultimate goals: 
social and environmental well-being. 
As ambiguous as this underlying conflict is Correa’s position towards the initiative. While 
publicly supporting “Plan A”, non-extraction, he has repeatedly referred to “Plan B”: business as 
usual, the extraction of oil, and oscillates between the two goals (Martin, 2010, p.23). Here, debates 
about granting drilling concessions for blocks in the direct neighborhood of Yasuní undermined 
international credibility of the ITT proposal (ibid.). On a more general level, Correa oscillates 
between openly associating with civil society organizations and publicly offending them. When 
running for office, he employed a fairly populist agenda and aimed to end Ecuador’s “’long 
neoliberal night’” (qtd. in Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010, p.6) and thus joined forces with actors 
of civil society who had long protested against neoliberalization. In 2007, however, he denounced 
several of his supporters as “extortionists [,] terrorists [,] romantic environmentalists and […] 
infantile leftists” (qtd. in Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010, p.7) and claimed that those groups 
constitute a small fraction of society that does not represent peoples from the Amazon, who 
allegedly support the extraction of oil. 
Given this unstable political background, it is not surprising that the international 
coordination of relevant actors is equally unstable, particularly in relation to the mechanism of 
                                                 
17  Since the late 1990s, an increasing number of left-wing politicians came to power in South America; a tendency that 
has colloquially been described as a „pink tide“. Prominent examples of this tendency in elections are the afore-
mentioned late Chávez (1999-2013, when he passed away and Nicolás Maduro took his place), Morales (2006), and 
Correa (2007). Those leaders openly oppose further tendencies of neoliberalization that had aggravated social and 
environmental problems in their respective countries and pursue similar political – and often fairly populist – 
agendas (Arsel, 2012, Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010). 
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compensation (Martin, 2010, p.32 ff.). In the first drafts, the international community was to 
contribute out of valuation for biodiversity and receive Yasuní Guarantee Certificates as a guarantee 
of perpetual non-extraction in exchange. At first, the value of the certificates was to be based on the 
2009 price of petroleum in accordance with the initiative’s main goal; in a later version, however, 
the idea arose to base the value on the price of carbon and to open up existing emission trading 
schemes like the European Union Emission Trading Scheme for the certificates, emphasizing the 
initiative’s contribution to combatting climate change. As Martin (2010) summarizes, “the concept 
of leaving oil underground, while still central to the proposal, had been transformed to the 
environmental benefit of avoided emissions” (p.35). Today, the price of guarantee certificates is still 
based on the market-value of carbon; however, rather than including them into emission trading 
schemes, they are a symbolic guarantee of non-extraction and thus a tool towards post-Kyoto 
mechanisms of climate change mitigation – the avoidance rather than trading of emissions. 
While this compensation mechanism was finally settled in the 2010 trust fund agreement 
with the UN, it becomes evident that crucial negotiations concerning the funding took place on the 
international level and not in close contact with Ecuador’s indigenous and environmental actors. 
Although the initiative in its “globalized” form is still beneficial to its initiators, a significant 
transformation has taken place that hampered non-governmental access to the process of shaping 
the initiative. As a result of the trust fund negotiations, the initiative’s contribution to climate 
change has become the central focus of the project and other positive effects of the oil moratorium 
seem to take second place: the emphasis on indigenous rights – most importantly the Tagaeri and 
Taromenane’s right to live in voluntary isolation – are often mentioned in the same breath as the 
protection of biodiversity, making the tribes sound like another component of biodiversity rather 
than actors that claim the right to live within the environment of their choice.  
This reframing of the initiative is necessary to gain international recognition and, 
consequently, financial support. While non-extraction out of ethical reasons or concern for 
indigenous rights do not constitute ideas that easily create international resonance and cause 
alterations of the political economy of industrial nations, protecting the rainforest and mitigating 
climate change, on the other hand, are issues that are relevant to other international actors, 
especially as awareness for the risks associated with climate change is growing. Therefore, like the 
indigenous protest groups who depicted themselves as the guardians of the pristine rainforest in the 
1990s (Sawyer, 2004), it is easier to gain the necessary public support for the initiative and to alter 
international norms by appealing to reasons that are familiar to other actors. Put radically, at the 
expense of its initiators’ ideas, the initiative has been made publicly and financially viable.  
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There is a concept that is helpful to describe the dangers of the ongoing tension between 
negotiations on the national and international level: Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s idea of global 
projection. Enzensberger (1974) argues that the ecological movement often uses the metaphor of a 
“’spaceship earth’” to portray the earth as a “closed and global eco-system.” By doing so, 
Enzensberger sees “one of the oldest ways of giving legitimacy to class domination and exploitation 
[…] resurrected”: by appealing to a feeling of “global brotherliness”, or the universal relevance of 
an issue, questions that are relevant on a smaller scale like an analysis of the “distribution of costs 
and profits” are sidestepped in favor of larger goals. This is related to Wolfgang Sachs’ (2002) view 
on economic growth: the global ideal of economic growth is reinforced to sidestep the hard question 
of justice (p.25). In the context of ITT, conflicts within Ecuador – indígenas and environmentalists 
fighting for the application of constitutional rights – might be increasingly downplayed in favor of 
the climate change mitigation efforts the initiative brings with it on a global scale.  
The projection of the initiative onto the global climate change mitigation scene is nicely 
illustrated by the advance of members of civil society into ministerial jobs. Arsel and Angel (2012) 
speak of an “exodus of major figures from civil society to the state” (p.216): several people who 
were involved with the idea of an oil moratorium were recruited by Correa for his administration 
when the initiative gained momentum on the national level – Alberto Acosta, author of “The Curse 
of Abundance”, who was named Minister of Energy and Mines in 2007, and Maria Fernanda 
Espinoza, regional director of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, who became 
Correa’s Minister of Coordination of Heritage (Arsel & Angel, 2012, p. 215). Persons who had 
initially been involved with the proposal advanced from local figures to globally relevant actors, 
turning the initiative into a state policy rather than an activist proposal. While those appointments 
clearly document the initiative’s national success, they also illustrate the danger of influential civil 
society leaders to dissociate from their original role and to neglect close interactions with civil 
society in favor of the international sphere. In fact, the global projection has succeeded to obscure 
the origins of the initiative: A webpage answering frequent questions about the initiative states that 




Conclusion – A New Framework for Environmental Justice? 
Does the Yasuní-ITT initiative contribute to environmental justice for indigenous tribes in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon? The initiative pursues goals both on the international and the national level 
                                                 
18
 See http://awildidea-movie.com/faq.php; accessed 03/05/2013 
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and in consequence involves negotiations on different programmatic levels: between the Ecuadorian 
civil society and the Ecuadorian government, as well as between the Ecuadorian government and 
other governments and international NGOs. This situation raises the question of how to reconcile 
those goals and therefore, the answer to the initial question depends on the perspective from which 
the issue is analyzed. 
  On the level of distributive justice, the answer is yes, locally for indígenas, but also on a 
global level. In the Amazon region, the foregone oil extraction prevents further environmental 
degradation and negative effects on human health. While indígenas have previously borne the cost 
of oil development, the initiative eliminates the costs of extraction altogether. Not only do they no 
longer take place in indigenous peoples’ backyards, they are no longer located in anyone’s backyard 
– a goal in line with critical approaches to environmental justice that entail a reconsideration of the 
political economy. On a global level, this NIABY approach is also visible: if emissions are avoided, 
their contribution to climate change is avoided, sparing anybody the risk of dealing with an 
additional 410 tons of carbon.  
 Concerning procedural justice, the matter is more opaque. As negotiations take place on 
several levels, and as Ecuador depends on international financial support, the initiative has to be 
presented in a way that resonates with the donor organizations, a situation that threatens to 
compromise the original intent. When focusing on climate change and the protection of biodiversity, 
other strands of environmentalism seem to be more present than environmental justice. It is not as 
much about the assertion of indigenous self-determination; rather, the “cult of the wilderness” with 
its focus on the protection of pristine nature and the “gospel of eco-efficiency” with its 
quantification of natural resources are visible. 
However, in the long run the initiative might uniquely connect those two strains of 
environmentalism to environmental justice. ITT proposes a turn towards a post-petroleum society 
and a strategy of development centered on buen vivir, the harmonious co-existence with nature. By 
doing so, the initiative suggests a perception of an intact nature as a form of value native to 
developing countries and attempts to transcend dominant understandings of commodified 
ecosystems. The initiative is an emancipatory proposal that implies the alteration of established 
international norms and ideas and in this regard, it might contribute to procedural justice for 
Ecuador on the international level: A developing country is posing a challenge to the international 
community, and thus a challenge to established power relations. 
What is more, the initiative might also promote procedural justice for indígenas. While 
inconsistencies continue to threaten the initiative’s success until today and the success of the trust 
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fund remains to be seen, the initiative, while currently not mainly a mechanism of environmental 
justice on the community level, proposes a promising framework in which environmental justice for 
indigenous groups can be further pursued: the potential alteration of perceptions of the global 
political economy and subsequent improvements in social and ecological conditions. Put differently, 
a new framework of international norms might emerge that is more conducive to environmental 
justice than the current paradigm: if development is no longer simultaneous with the extraction of 
oil, concepts like sumak kawsay stand a chance of being implemented and of improving the socio-
environmental situation of disadvantaged groups. Equally important is the replicability of the 
initiative for other developing countries rich in biodiversity: an alternative model of development is 
presented which might contribute to a sustainable alteration of discourse – and thus power relations 
– on the international level.  
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EJ – Environmental Justice 
EJM – Environmental Justice Movement 
NIABY – Not In Anyone’s Backyard 
NIMBY – Not in My Backyard 
NOPE – Not on Planet Earth  
PIBBY – Place in Blacks’ Backyards 
SJ – Social Justice 
